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In October 2012, the governments of Colombia, 
Guatemala and Mexico issued a joint declaration 
calling for a UN General Assembly Special Session 
(UNGASS) to be held on the urgent issue of drug 
policy.1 The conference – the 30th Special Session, 
and the third focused on drugs – took place in New 
York from 19th to 21st April 2016.2 The meeting 
comprised a Plenary – at which a pre-negotiated 
Outcome Document3 was adopted at the very start, 
followed by a varied and long list of country state-
ments – and a series of five thematic ‘roundtable’ 
debates, all of which are captured below. 
 
The preparations for this Special Session were led 
from 6,700 km away in Vienna, Austria, by the UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and guided 
by a specially appointed ‘UNGASS Board’.⁴ The scope 
of the UNGASS debate was promptly restricted to 
be ‘within the framework of the three international 
drug control conventions’.5 The UNGASS Outcome 
Document was also negotiated entirely in Vienna, 
in a rushed series of ‘informal informals’, which 
are closed meetings with a large number of UN 
member states absent6 and from which civil society 
observers are excluded. The lack of transparency 
and accountability in this process led a large 
group of civil society organisations to raise serious 
reservations in a joint public statement.7 By the 
time the show moved to New York in April, the 
Outcome Document was already finalised and a 
number of barriers were in place to hinder civil 
society participation. This all served to ensure that 
the UNGASS was not the drug policy revolution that 
some stakeholders seemed to be expecting. In spite 
of these challenges, the UNGASS created much 
needed momentum and mobilisation for reform 
among civil society, UN agencies, the media and 
several member states. It also provided the clearest 
indication to date that the global consensus on drug 
policy is fundamentally broken. While many people 
came away with mixed emotions, the UNGASS has 
undoubtedly ploughed fertile ground for ongoing 
efforts to reform and improve the global response 
to drugs.
Introduction
Opening segment of the UNGASS
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The Plenary
Introductory remarks
The main Plenary of the Special Session ran across 
six morning and afternoon sessions over the three 
days, all of which have been captured and sum-
marised on the CND Blog.8 After a minute’s silence 
to remember those whose lives have been lost, the 
Session was opened by the President of the 70th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
Mogens Lykketoft from Denmark. Framing drug 
policy within the broader context of the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs),⁹ Mr. Lykketoft stat-
ed that  ‘We need to respect proportionality and the 
wellbeing of the individual… We must look at new 
approaches and reflect on our past policies’. 
The UN Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, 
called for more balanced approaches including al-
ternatives to incarceration, while acknowledging 
that ‘some aspects are sensitive and controversial’. 
This was followed by opening speeches from the 
Vienna-based triad: the Chair of the CND (Vladimir 
Galuska from the Czech Republic), the Executive 
Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC, Yury Fedotov) and the President 
of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB, 
Werner Sipp). Mr. Galuska spoke of the ‘spirit of con-
sensus’ in Vienna, ‘despite our differences and the 
different challenges we face’. Mr. Fedotov highlight-
ed that “global drug policy must put people first” 
and the need for the agreed commitments and ac-
tions to be backed by funding.10 
In one of the more progressive statements from 
the INCB in recent memory, Werner Sipp repeatedly 
emphasised that ‘the [international drug control] 
conventions never called for a war on drugs’, that 
‘there is no treaty obligation to incarcerate for minor 
offenses such as possession of small quantities for 
personal use’, and that ‘inhumane punishments 
and treatment of [people who use drugs] is not in 
line with the conventions’. However, he explicitly 
drew the line at regulated markets: ‘This does not 
extend to non-medical regulation of illicit drugs 
such as cannabis. This is not compatible with the 
conventions’. Interestingly, Mr. Sipp was one of 
only a handful of speakers throughout the Special 
Session to explicitly refer to the cannabis regulation 
policies being newly implemented and adopted in 
some member states – this topic being the largest 
elephant in the room during UNGASS.11
In a welcome development, the Director General 
of the World Health Organisation (WHO), Margaret 
Chan, was then invited to the podium to speak. 
Although Dr. Chan’s leadership on this issue had 
not been as prominent as was hoped for during 
the UNGASS preparations, the inclusion of the 
WHO on the opening panel builds upon the strong 
cross-UN engagement in the UNGASS (something 
which needs to be sustained and nurtured beyond 
2016).15 She referenced harm reduction services 
such as needle and syringe programmes and 
opioid substitution therapy, and told of her time 
in Hong Kong where methadone maintenance 
programmes have significantly reduced crime. 
She also highlighted the plight of those in need 
of controlled substances for the treatment of pain 
Box  1   Reaching out to  
Ban Ki-Moon
Days before the UNGASS began, a letter 
calling for more humane drug policies 
was signed by more than 1,000 leading 
figures including former heads of state, US 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and a 
long list of celebrities and public figures.10 
The letter was addressed to the UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon, who had earlier called 
for the UNGASS to be ‘a wide-ranging and 
open debate that considers all options’.11 
However, the Secretary-General was not in 
attendance in New York – and copies of the 
letter were confiscated by security officers 
within the UN building along with other civil 
society materials.12
 f celebrities and public figures.12
 t at considers all options’.13
4
Copy of the letter coordinated by the Drug Policy Alliance 
calling for more humane drug policies 
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– an ‘outcome’ being agreed before the UNGASS 
debates had even begun. It was a clear expression 
of fears that the fragile consensus on the document 
(see below) might break apart in New York.19 But it 
created a sense of tedium as the Plenary sessions 
wore on with no clear goal at the end other than 
the closure of the meeting. 
The Outcome Document was the subject of 
protracted and heated negotiations in Vienna over 
several months – climaxing at the CND in March 
2016. On the one hand, it contains elements of solid 
progress compared to its predecessors – even its 
structure is an improvement – moving away from 
an overly simplistic three pillar approach (demand 
reduction, supply reduction and international 
cooperation) to a more comprehensive and cross-
cutting seven pillar structure (demand reduction 
and related measures; access to controlled 
substances for medical and scientific purposes; 
supply reduction and related measures; human 
rights and cross-cutting issues; evolving trends and 
emerging challenges; international cooperation; 
and alternative development). Among other 
things, the Outcome Document welcomes the 
SDGs, it refers to the concept of proportionality 
for the first time, it refers to ‘injecting equipment 
programmes’, ‘medication-assisted therapy’ and 
naloxone (an essential medicine used to reverse 
opiate overdoses), it includes good language on 
the need to mainstream a gender perspective, and 
it calls for ‘alternative or additional measures with 
regard to conviction or punishment’.
But on the other hand, the Outcome Document 
is a far cry from the promised ‘short, substantive, 
concise and action-oriented document’. It fails 
to recognise the lack of progress achieved by 
international drug control (even citing ‘tangible 
progress’ that has been achieved, without any 
justification), and reaffirms the unrealistic goal of ‘a 
society free of drug abuse’. It fails to acknowledge 
the growing calls for the abolition of the death 
penalty, nor the reality of cannabis regulation in 
some states, and does not explicitly mention ‘harm 
reduction’ despite this being agreed UN General 
Assembly language.20 The document is also notably 
light on any measurable targets or outcomes, and 
does not mention proposals for an expert advisory 
group.21 Crucially, even where positive language 
was negotiated into the Outcome Document, it was 
heavily caveated with diplomatic get-outs such as 
The Chair of the UNGASS 
Board
The final opening speaker was Ambassador 
Khaled Shamaa from Egypt, in his capacity 
as Chair of the UNGASS preparations 
board in Vienna. Ambassador Shamaa had 
successfully secured this new role once his 
Chairmanship of the CND expired in 2014 
– in order to maintain control of the design 
and delivery of various UNGASS processes, 
not least the negotiation of the Outcome 
Document itself. At times during the process 
his conduct in this role was opaque and 
questionable, and this became a growing 
frustration for reform-minded member states 
and civil society alike. Many of the important 
decisions lacked transparency – such as 
which submissions and language were being 
accepted into the Outcome Document drafts, 
and which remained ‘parked’ or side-lined to 
avoid difficult discussions.16 
The Chair’s tactics were especially prominent 
at the CND in March 2016, where an 
agreement on the Outcome Document was 
eventually brokered in the early hours of the 
morning on the last day – following much 
confusion and delay to increase the sense of 
brinkmanship, with most of the negotiations 
taking place within a series of closed ‘informal 
informals’ (sessions for which even regional 
bodies such as the European Union and 
African Union were denied entry as well 
as civil society observers). Problematically, 
decisions taken in the closed meetings, out 
of sight of observers, were then considered 
final and could not be reopened in the formal 
sessions.17 That such behaviour did not solicit 
more explicit complaints from member states 
was disappointing.
and other conditions: ‘When you go home after this 
conference, I urge you to remember these people’. 
The Outcome Document
With the opening speeches and formalities out of 
the way, Mr. Lykketoft then presented the Outcome 
Document for approval without a vote, which was 
met by no objections from member states and a 
round of applause.18 This created an odd situation 
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‘as appropriate’ (mentioned a staggering 46 times 
in the document), ‘where appropriate’ (10 times), 
and ‘in accordance with [their] national legislation’ 
(14 mentions). The document also underlines the 
flexibility within the conventions but unfortunately 
in a confusing and contradictory way (see Box 2). A 
more detailed analysis of the Outcome Document 
can be found in the CND Proceedings report.24  
Paradoxically, the adoption of the Outcome 
Document ‘by consensus’ was immediately followed 
by a series of interventions outlining elements that 
some countries did not agree with.25 For example, 
Uruguay noted the absence of decriminalisation – 
‘a human right which we must protect’ – and that 
there was ‘no serious balance’ in the document, nor 
acceptance of harm reduction strategies ‘which 
have proven effective in tackling this problem’. 
Jamaica expressed that they were ‘not entirely 
satisfied with the document’ due to the lack of 
focus on the rights of indigenous groups.
The lack of consensus among member states 
was particularly highlighted with regards to the 
Outcome Document’s failure, as with the Joint 
Ministerial Statement from 2014,26 to include 
any references to the death penalty for drug 
offences. Switzerland, Brazil, Costa Rica, Norway 
and Uruguay all made statements lamenting the 
absence of this central issue. This was then followed 
by a group statement read by Indonesia on behalf 
of China, Singapore, Yemen, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Iran and Sudan – stating that ‘There is no 
international consensus on the prohibition of the 
death penalty… Every State has the sovereign 
right to choose what is in its own best interest’. In 
turn, this was followed by a statement on behalf of 
the 28 European Union members and 28 additional 
countries27 which stated that ‘We have a strong 
and unequivocal opposition to the death penalty 
in all circumstances, and consider that the death 
penalty undermines human dignity and errors 
made in its application are irreversible. Moreover, 
imposing the death penalty for drug offences is 
against norms of international law, specifically Art. 
6 Para 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’.
Country statements
The ‘general debate’ was then able to start, with 
each country making a statement outlining their 
own national contexts, policies and positions – 
starting with the President of Guatemala, Jimmy 
Morales. President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico 
then received an ovation from the civil society 
participants on the balcony when he gave his 
support to countries working towards cannabis 
regulation: ‘We must move beyond prohibition 
to effective prevention and effective regulation. 
Thousands of lives depend on this’ (although 
it should be noted that he then opposed such 
regulation once he returned to Mexico). The 
remaining plenary statements then came over 
three days from member states, regional groups, 
and other ‘observers’ such as the Holy See (who 
never resist the opportunity to share their expert 
views: ‘Drugs are an evil, and with evil there can 
be neither surrender nor compromise’). These 
statements are best summarised in terms of some 
thematic highlights.28
Box  2  ‘Sufficient’ flexibility? 22
There were many individual battles and 
tensions during the negotiation of the 
UNGASS Outcome Document,23 but one of the 
most interesting surrounded the statement 
that ‘the three international drug control 
conventions… allow for sufficient flexibility 
for States parties to design and implement 
national drug policies’. 
This was part of the concerted efforts throu-
ghout the UNGASS process to protect the 
integrity of the drug conventions – led by 
the USA and European Union with sup-
port from the G7 and the Vienna-based UN 
entities. Several more regressive member 
states also supported this concept, as the 
conventions explicitly permit the use of 
‘more strict or severe’ approaches – which 
may include forced treatment and the  
death penalty.
The addition of the word ‘sufficient’ sought 
to shut down any attempts to revise or 
question the treaties, or to promote policies 
and responses outside of those allowed by 
the conventions – including the regulatory 
markets being applied for coca in Bolivia, or 
cannabis in Uruguay and parts of the USA, 
and being considered in Jamaica, Mexico 
and Canada among others. A small group of 
countries therefore strongly opposed this 
language, but to no avail.
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Harm reduction
The European Union statement – on behalf of 
all 28 member states – stated that ‘Risk and harm 
reduction measures must be further promoted 
and implemented’. Additional support came 
from the statements of Belgium, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, the Maldives, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Vietnam and 
the Pompidou Group. At the same time, Canada 
supported drug consumption rooms and naloxone 
distribution, while the USA spoke in favour of 
medication-assisted therapy. The only country to 
speak explicitly against harm reduction in their 
Plenary statement was Singapore, whose speech 
stated that ‘When you go down the route of harm 
reduction… drugs harm the abuser, their family 
and community’.
Decriminalisation
Colombia’s country statement contended that 
‘Not one mother would prefer the jail option. Jails 
are for criminals, not for addicts. Criminalization 
has affected the weakest ones in the chain: farm-
ers, mules and consumers’. Additional support for a 
move away from criminalisation came from Costa 
Rica, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Iceland, 
Jamaica, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Swit-
zerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the USA and 
Uruguay. Many other countries and the European 
Union cited the need for more proportionate sen-
tencing. Some countries, however, spoke directly 
against the decriminalisation of drug use, including 
Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan (both on behalf 
of the Africa Group, and in their own statement) and 
Turkey (who announced that they have increased 
penalties). Nicaragua and Zambia also claimed that 
decriminalisation was contrary to the international 
drug conventions, despite recent assurances from 
the INCB and the UNODC that this is not the case.
A drug-free world
Countries such as Albania, Burkina Faso, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cuba, Egypt, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Vietnam 
all reaffirmed their ambitions for a society free 
of drugs – as did the African Group, the African 
Union and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Singapore went further still and 
declared ‘we are drug free’, while Brunei Darussalam 
pronounced itself ‘relatively drug free’. Statements 
Box  3  Striving for system-
wide coherence
One of the notable positives from the UNGASS 
was undoubtedly the heightened engage-
ment from across a wide variety of UN agen-
cies, rather than just from the Vienna-based 
drug control entities. This was welcomed as 
it better reflected the cross-cutting nature of 
drug policy, and especially because the contri-
butions from these agencies were, on the 
whole, progressive.
Through the United Nations System Task Force 
on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug 
Trafficking, UN agencies were invited to make 
submissions on how the international drug 
control system impacts upon their respective 
mandates – and responses came from the 
WHO, the World Food Programme (WFP), the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), UN Women, UNAIDS, the UN 
Office For Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the 
United Nations University, the Department 
of Political Affairs (DPA), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the INCB, 
the UNODC, the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to health, the UN Interregional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute ( UNICRI), and the 
Human Rights Council.29 Many of these sub-
missions covered issues such as rebalancing 
drug control policies, harm reduction, human 
rights, access to medicines, and development 
– and the likes of UNAIDS, UNDP, UN Women 
and the Human Rights Council also endorsed 
the need for decriminalisation.30
At the UNGASS itself, many of these UN 
agencies had a notably improved presence 
compared to other international drug policy 
fora – making a series of positive interventions 
during the roundtables and plenary. These 
included the opening speech by the WHO 
Director General (covered above) and an 
excellent roundtable intervention from the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, in which 
he supported decriminalisation and harm 
reduction and gave a strong assessment of the 
shortcomings of the Outcome Document.31 
This cross-UN engagement is something that 
needs to be maintained and capitalised upon 
in order to ensure a lasting legacy from the 
UNGASS for system-wide engagement in the 
drug control debate.
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from 20 countries additionally expressed varying 
degrees of support for the ‘war on drugs’ approach 
against the ‘scourge’ of drugs.32 The Russian 
Federation proclaimed that ‘some skeptics [sic] and 
pessimists argued that the world community had 
lost its war against drugs. We cannot accept this. We 
have by no means lost the war, but to win we must 
achieve a new level of solidarity and unity’.
On the other side, Colombia urged countries to 
‘recognize honestly that we do not have a world 
free from alcohol, tobacco or violence, and that we 
will not have a world free from drugs’. Cyprus also 
conceded that ‘We regret that a drug-free world is 
not realistic’, while Liechtenstein highlighted that 
‘no country is drug-free’. A number of countries also 
spoke of the need for a new approach and a new 
paradigm for drug policy – including Belarus, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Liechten-
stein, Mexico, Portugal, Switzerland, Trinidad and 
Tobago, the USA, Uruguay and Venezuela, as well as 
the Organization of American States. The statement 
by St Vincent and the Grenadines criticised the ‘cul 
de sac of trite, ineffective rhetoric’ and urged that 
‘Ten years from now, let it not be said that the in-
ternational community continued to delude itself 
about the efficacy of its war on drugs’. In one of the 
highlights of the UNGASS, the Canadian delegate 
announced their plans to regulate cannabis in 2017 
to ‘keep marijuana out of the hands of children and 
profits out of the hands of criminals’.
Roundtable 1: Drugs and health33
One of first speakers at this roundtable, UNAIDS 
Executive Director Michel Sidibe, asked the 
delegates: ‘Will we continue with a war on drugs 
prioritising law enforcement and a criminal justice 
response, or will we restore the balance to improve 
the health and wellbeing of humankind?’ It was 
a pertinent question for the participants – after 
more than 60 years of implementing a repressive 
approach towards drugs, were UN member states 
ready to re-balance their strategies to prioritise 
health? Mr. Sidibe’s response was clear: ‘It is time to 
right the wrongs of global drug policies’.
The subsequent discussions included a welcome 
focus on the availability of controlled substances 
for medical and scientific needs. The INCB speaker 
reiterated that more than 92% of people who had 
access to morphine were from just 17% of the 
world’s countries, with ‘most people left with limited 
or no access’ to controlled medicines. According 
to the INCB, this is because of a series of ‘major 
impediments to access’ such as inadequate estimates 
that do not reflect actual needs, punishments 
for inadequate prescribing, lack of training and 
awareness, fear of dependence, cultural attitudes 
and fear of diversion. It was therefore welcome to 
see a wide range of countries – including Norway, 
Tunisia, New Zealand, Australia, Colombia and the 
UK – calling for better access to these substances. 
National reforms were presented by countries such 
as Panama and Mexico – who were also joined by 
the Czech Republic, New Zealand and Colombia 
in promoting access to medicinal cannabis, in 
addition to the substances included in the WHO List 
of Essential Medicines which are agreed to be basic 
components of any functional health system.  
The remainder of the roundtable focused on health-
based approaches targeting people who use drugs. 
The US delegate acknowledged the harms caused 
by prohibitive policies: ‘Forty years ago, my country 
initiated a war on drugs, that unintentionally 
became a war on people who use drugs. It ended 
up stigmatising and criminalising them instead 
of addressing the root of the problem… People 
living with addiction need support and treatment’. 
Both Chile and the Czech Republic explicitly 
called for the decriminalisation of people who use 
drugs, while Australia and Cyprus presented local 
diversion mechanisms offering treatment instead 
of incarceration for low-level offenders. 
Others focused on access to health services, with a 
strong focus on harm reduction. This included the 
Czech Republic, Norway, New Zealand, Canada, 
Colombia, the USA, as well as the European Union, 
whose delegate concluded, ‘Drug policies must be 
based on facts – member states have no excuse 
not to apply risk and harm reduction measures’. 
Calls for a health-based approach toward people 
who use drugs were also the key focus of the 
pre-selected civil society speakers from Senegal, 
Australia, Scotland and Norway. UNAIDS reminded 
participants that the 2015 target to reduce HIV 
infections among people who inject drugs had 
been spectacularly missed: ‘People are being 
left behind because of prejudice, discrimination 
and bad laws’. Michel Sidibe also called for the 
redirection of drug control funding towards harm 
reduction.34 A member of the UK Parliament from 
the Scottish National Party and civil society speaker 
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at the roundtable called for ‘leadership in harm 
reduction’, that is, ‘increasing political support and 
funding for harm reduction’. He added, ‘A tiny shift 
in funding could virtually end AIDS among people 
who inject drugs by 2030’. New Zealand and the 
UK also explained the importance of ensuring 
‘that the environment and social determinants of 
health are in place’ – i.e. that programmes address 
poverty, housing, education and employment. In 
a similar vein, Brazil called for more attention to 
be given to harm reduction for stimulant use, in 
particular cocaine and methamphetamine, citing 
its successful programmes in Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro in addressing the health and social harms 
associated with stimulant use.
The interventions were not all progressive, however, 
and the panellist from Singapore reiterated 
their goal of a drug-free country and a drug-free 
ASEAN through ‘tough laws to prevent drug use’. 
The Chinese delegate argued that offering harm 
reduction was ‘in essence legalisation, as users 
are free to use drugs’ – showing a clear lack of 
understanding of the concept of harm reduction 
and contradicting the country’s own harm 
reduction programmes. With regards to legalisation, 
both Spain and the Dominican Republic explicitly 
rejected this approach, the latter stating that ‘Any 
policy making drugs more easily accessible should 
be rejected’.
Roundtable 2: Drugs and crime35
The discussions during this roundtable were 
dominated by issues such as internet-based drug 
markets, new psychoactive substances (NPS), 
money laundering, and dealing with the proceeds 
of crime. The panel comprised government 
representatives from Ghana, Japan, the USA, 
Uruguay and the Russian Federation, alongside 
a civil society representative from X-Cons. Japan 
expressed concerns about the links between 
drugs and terrorism (citing cases where drugs 
were used to motivate suicide bombers) and 
outlined their development assistance to support 
supply reduction measures overseas. Russia 
focused on the need to strengthen financial 
intelligence, anti-money laundering measures and 
international cooperation. 
Shifting away from the traditional rhetoric on 
supply reduction, the USA spoke about its reform 
efforts targeting violent traffickers rather than 
micro-traffickers and people who use drugs. 
Uruguay went a step further and highlighted 
their alternative approaches to supply reduction, 
such as regulating drug markets, stating that 
prosecuting low-level offenders is ineffective. The 
civil society representative, Peter Soderlund from 
X-Cons, spoke of the need to support people who 
have been criminalised for drug-related activities, 
as well as calling on member states to remove 
the death penalty – ‘a primitive punishment in a 
modern world’.
The statements from other member states reflected 
a variety of priorities and concerns. They ranged 
from focusing only on law enforcement measures 
(such as precursor control, and controls on NPS), to 
recognising supply reduction as one component 
that fits as part of a balanced drug policy approach. 
The UK noted the inclusion of proportionality of 
UNGASS Roundtable 1 on drugs and health
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sentencing and alternatives to incarceration in the 
UNGASS Outcome Document, while Nigeria and 
Pakistan stated their opposition to legalisation. 
China recognised the lack of consensus on the use 
of the death penalty, noting that some countries 
refuse to cooperate with others that implement 
the death penalty, and called on member states to 
overcome these differences.
Uruguay and Mexico were the only member states 
calling for a complete reorientation of supply 
reduction policies – alongside Penal Reform 
International and Jeffrey Feltman, the UN Under-
Secretary-General for Political Affairs who called 
on countries to focus on ‘poverty, inequality and 
violence reduction as principal goals of drug policy’ 
consistent with the 2030 Sustainable Development 
Agenda. The Mexican delegate stated that 
although supply reduction measures have focused 
on aerial spraying and dismantling drug producing 
laboratories, the root causes of supply is poverty 
and economic disparity. The Mexican delegate also 
stated that supply reduction has failed as a result, 
and called for more humane approaches. Andrea 
Huber from Penal Reform International spoke on 
behalf of several NGOs and noted that punitive 
approaches to drug policy have contributed to 
the erosion of fair trial and justice rights, and 
have resulted in negative consequences including 
overcrowded prisons and overburdened criminal 
justice systems. She noted concerns about ‘the 
disproportionate effect [of drug control] on ethnic 
and other minorities and the disproportionate 
impact on women who play minor roles in the drug 
trade but are easy targets for law enforcement’. 
She recommended decriminalising the use and 
possession of drugs for personal use, and called 
on governments to ensure that their spending on 
law enforcement was balanced compared with 
other drug policy interventions. She also called on 
governments to ‘look at different measures instead 
of only considering the numbers of arrests and 
seizures... to evaluate the success of drug policies’.
Towards the end of the session, Uruguay noted that 
the governments present had not taken advantage 
of the opportunity to engage in a proper debate 
about addressing the lack of balance in drug 
policies. 
Roundtable 3: Cross-cutting 
issues: Drugs and human rights, 
youth, women, children and 
communities36
The third roundtable on human rights represented 
the culmination of several years of hard fought 
advocacy, and so was much anticipated. From 
the panel, both Costa Rica and Sweden strongly 
Costa Rican Ambassador in Vienna discussing the impacts of punitive drug policies on women at UNGASS roundtable on drugs and 
human rights
A more humane drug policy is possible
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highlighted the need to address the gender 
dimension of drug policies, and the issue of how 
women have been disproportionately affected by 
punitive drug policies was one which was raised 
repeatedly by many speakers throughout the 
roundtable. The second issue that clearly resonated 
with many was the abolition of the death penalty for 
drug offences. Sweden kicked this off on the panel 
by expressing regret that the UNGASS Outcome 
Document failed to call for abolition. Tellingly, when 
the Indonesian panellist spoke directly afterwards, 
she did not mention the renewed application of 
capital punishment in Jakarta.
The final two panellists were Maria-Ane Goretti, a 
human rights lawyer and IDPC consultant from 
Ghana, and Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Both delivered a 
comprehensive and scathing assessment of how 
drug control policies undermine the enjoyment 
of a broad range of human rights. The High 
Commissioner spoke of how the UNGASS had 
evoked both ‘suppressed excitement’ due to the 
‘discernible progress, however modest it may 
be’ towards health and human rights principles, 
but also ‘intense frustration’ because that was so 
painstakingly slow given the clear evidence in 
favour of ending punitive policies.37
The interventions that followed from the floor 
were mostly weighted in favour of acknowledging 
the negative impacts of overly repressive, 
disproportionate and punitive drug policies. 
Argentina, in particular, gave an impassioned 
speech and lamented the huge resources wasted on 
the ‘war on drugs’, noting that current policies were 
failing, otherwise governments would not have to 
spend so much time discussing them! Many other 
participants also echoed Sweden by calling for an 
end to the death penalty for drug offences, while 
China and Singapore emphasised the national 
sovereignty of member states to devise their own 
policies, including the death penalty. In fact, these 
two countries seemed to be at odds with the 
predominant discourse at the roundtable overall – 
rejecting the notion of individual rights in favour of 
the rights of society to be ‘free from drug abuse’. 
The most memorable moment in this roundtable 
came from Ricky Gunawan,38 a human rights lawyer 
who had worked for more than a decade with 
the Brazilian Rodrigo Gularte who was recently 
executed in Indonesia. Ricky was originally due 
to be on the panel, but was dropped in favour of 
an Indonesian government representative. He 
delivered an eloquent and emotional intervention 
from the floor that gave a human face to what is 
often an abstract and detached debate. He broke 
down during his speech as he recalled that his client, 
who was mentally disabled, had not understood he 
was to be executed until just two hours beforehand. 
Mr. Gunawan condemned those governments 
who were ‘addicted to the death penalty’, calling 
it a useless and senseless response. Throughout 
his intervention, the majority of the civil society 
representatives silently stood as a mark of solidarity, 
followed by a few Member State representatives as 
well. Many in the room were moved to tears and 
the applause after Ricky had finished continued for 
several minutes. 
Roundtable 4: New challenges, 
threats and realities39
The tone for this roundtable was set from the 
beginning when the co-chair from Estonia stated 
that drugs are not harmful and dangerous because 
they are illegal, rather they are illegal because 
they are dangerous – a thinly disguised criticism 
of regulated cannabis markets. Similar views 
permeated most of the contributions, especially 
with regards to NPS – which became the focus of 
all four panellists from China, Colombia, Slovenia 
and the UK. Their statements highlighting the 
challenges that NPS pose to public health, existing 
Milton Romani, Uruguayan Drugs Coordinator at the UNGASS
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take into account domestic realities?’ She described 
the decriminalisation of possession for personal 
use and the development of regulated structures 
for medical use, and the problems relating to the 
Single Convention. Jamaica went on to ‘call for 
an examination of the international drug control 
legal framework to ascertain whether it is in need 
of revision in order to respond to current and 
emerging challenges to our global efforts’. Finally, on 
behalf of civil society, Rafael Toruella representing 
Intercambios Puerto Rico highlighted the harms 
caused by a prohibitionist approach towards drugs 
on health and development, stating that, ‘We must 
move from talking about hectares of illicit drugs that 
are being produced to how to deal with poverty, 
social inequality and promoting health’. Notably, 
the official summary of the roundtable chose not to 
mention these important points.
Roundtable 5: Drugs and 
development40
The final roundtable was co-chaired by Peru, the 
Bahamas and Iran. The representative from Mexico 
set the tone for the discussions from the very start, 
calling for a holistic response to the drug phenom-
enon, and lamenting the international commu-
nity’s fixation on alternative development without 
considering broader development imperatives. He 
then enumerated a set of suggestions for the way 
forward, including the increased involvement of 
relevant UN agencies (welcomed by Sweden, but 
rejected by the USA), and the organisation of an 
international forum to share experiences on less 
repressive policies, including decriminalisation and 
alternatives to incarceration. 
The two international pioneers of alternative 
development – Germany and Thailand – both 
reiterated the call for a broader approach linked 
to the SDGs. Germany called for a ‘human-centred’ 
approach, focusing on the ‘empowerment of farming 
communities’ to address the root-causes of their 
involvement as part of a ‘long-term’ development 
plan. This human-centred approach was reiterated 
throughout the discussions by countries such as 
Mexico, Thailand, Ecuador, India, Peru, Costa Rica 
and Sweden, as well as the European Union, the 
UNODC and the INCB – highlighting the need to 
address poverty, food security, land tenure, weak 
governance, infrastructure and access to markets, as 
well as the specific vulnerabilities faced by women. 
legal structures and traditional law enforcement 
approaches. The discussions highlighted the need 
for better information, improved monitoring and 
evaluation, the need for a balanced response, 
appropriate prevention and treatment, and the 
need for shared responsibility. The UK identified 
scheduling as an important tool, while China was 
keen to point out that NPS were often produced 
in developing countries but used in developed 
countries. Refreshingly, Slovenia also argued for 
a ‘person targeted’ approach that included harm 
reduction, risk management and a respect for 
human rights. Disappointingly, the discussions 
regarded NPS as a reason to remain vigilant and 
committed to existing responses, rather than on 
the role of current policies in generating the NPS 
market in the first place.  
The roundtable failed to open up into a genuine 
discussion, and instead became a series of coun-
try statements about the threat posed by NPS to 
young people (for example in Italy, El Salvador and 
Singapore), the importance of better monitoring 
(Brazil), the need for precise indicators (Italy), and 
the challenges posed by the use of the internet to 
sell NPS (Myanmar). In his statement on behalf of 
the UNODC, Yury Fedotov mentioned the (not so 
new) challenge of the dark net, while the Italian 
representative was regretful that the Outcome Doc-
ument did not include any mention of the phenom-
enon. Statements from both the WHO and Australia 
were noteworthy as they referred to not only NPS 
but also the importance of access to internationally 
controlled medicines. By subtly making the con-
nection between ketamine’s status as an essential 
medicine and (in some eyes) an NPS, the Australian 
representative stressed how important it was that 
efforts to control NPS did not serve to further re-
stricting access to medicines – a nod to China’s re-
cent efforts to ban ketamine internationally. 
While most member states expressed commitment 
to the drug control treaties, two statements stood 
out from the rest in their critiques. Ecuador stressed 
the need for a new public health paradigm in 
place of the failed ‘war on drugs’ approach, and 
cautioned that a monolithic view must be avoided. 
The Jamaican representative pointed out that 
‘old’ substances still needed attention, particularly 
cannabis: ‘For Jamaica, we see this as an opportune 
time to re-evaluate the systems that are currently 
in place… We ask, are they fit for purpose? Do they 
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Some exceptions were China and Indonesia, who 
both promoted crop eradication as an integral 
part of alternative development – with Indonesia 
advancing eradication as a ‘national priority’. 
Crucially, several member states did acknowledge 
the failures of repressive strategies. Colombia called 
on the international community to ‘understand the 
failures and limitations of the past’, 41 the European 
Union highlighted the ‘balloon effect’, and Ecuador 
and Thailand raised concerns about the damage 
of crop eradication on the environment (as 
opposed to Peru which limited its concerns to the 
environmental harms caused by drugs themselves). 
Another prominent topic was the severe gap 
in funding for alternative development – with 
Thailand calling for ‘flexible, long-term funding’ 
as well as new ways of measuring success. Mexico 
also proposed expanding the concept and focus to 
include urban settings (as did Ecuador, under the 
label of ‘preventative alternative development’). 
This was reiterated by Thailand, Brazil and 
Argentina, among others. Others, including Burkina 
Faso and the Bahamas, focused on issues of transit 
countries such as the link between development, 
drug trafficking and organised crime.
However, two issues were notably absent from 
member state interventions: the traditional use of 
controlled substances, and the need to decriminalise 
subsistence farmers. A highlight of the session 
was the interventions from two representatives of 
farmers of prohibited plants – an affected population 
whose voice had been conspicuously absent from 
the UNGASS debates so far. The interventions by 
Nang Pann Ei Kham (speaking on behalf of the 
Myanmar Farmers Forum) and Amapola Duran Salas 
(a Peruvian coca grower federation leader) provided 
a counterweight to the member state rhetoric and 
highlighted the severe impact of forced eradication 
on small-scale cultivators and the many failures 
of alternative development: ‘We farmers are not 
victims, we are not criminals, we are not terrorists. We 
are people who are in charge of feeding our world... 
In Peru poverty, injustice has grown tremendously 
because of crop eradication and we are tired of 
these policies that criminalise and penalise the 
sectors that grow these illicit crops’.42 
Civil society participation: 
Voices that cannot be silenced
The UNGASS was a moment of unprecedented 
mobilisation for civil society in favour of policy 
reform. In December 2014, the Civil Society 
Task Force for the UNGASS was launched – a 
collaborative effort between the Vienna and New 
York NGO Committees on Drugs to bring a broad 
civil society voice into the debates.43 The existence 
of the Task Force itself was the result of protracted 
discussions and advocacy, and the group comprised 
31 representatives from nine regions of the 
world as well as of affected populations (farmers, 
the palliative care sector, recovered drug users, 
families, youth, and people who use drugs), and 
global representatives from the harm reduction, 
prevention and criminal justice sectors.44 The 
Task Force held a series of regional and thematic 
consultations, in particular an Informal Interactive 
Stakeholder Consultation on 10th February 2016 
in New York which was overseen by the President 
of the General Assembly. A summary of the 
Consultation was formally submitted to the UNGASS 
process,45 and reflected the progressive tone of the 
Civil society daily passes to participate in the UNGASS
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Box   4  The UNGASS side events: Eclectic, but somewhat chaotic
Mindful of the significance of the New York 
meeting, it was unsurprising to see a large number 
of side events competing for the delegates’ 
attention. A total of 46 side events took place over 
four days – coordinated by a mix of UN agencies, 
regional bodies, member states and civil society 
groups, and covering an eclectic mix of issues.47 
Prominent among the topics were human rights, 
public health, evidence-based policies and 
alternative development. IDPC was involved in 
several if the events, working alongside a variety  
of partners.48
Side event organised by New Zealand, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, the Global Drug Policy Observatory, the International  
Centre for Science in Drug Policy, Transform and IDPC at the UNGASS, and moderated by New Zealand Associate Minister of 
Health  Hon. Peter Dunne
Sadly, few events escaped the organisational 
chaos that engulfed the UNGASS with regards 
to civil society access and security passes (see 
below). Whether deliberate or not, it was also 
noted that many of the more controversial side 
events from a UN perspective (such as the event 
on cannabis and the conventions) were held in 
the smaller conference rooms, with delegates 
forced to sit on the floor and spill out into  
the corridors.
The elephant in the room – despite huge attendance, side event on cannabis regulation and the UN drug conventions relegated 
to the smallest available room
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debate among civil society participants – including 
calls for decriminalisation and the recognition of 
traditional use of certain plants. However, it was 
scarcely referenced or discussed by the CND in their 
UNGASS preparations. The Task Force also issued a 
series of reports and submissions following their 
consultations with global civil society.48 
On 18th April, the Task Force held a Civil Society 
Forum with co-sponsorship from the Missions of 
Sweden and Colombia. The Forum featured civil 
society speakers from all over the world, and was 
opened by the President of the General Assembly 
among others. Unfortunately, hundreds of civil 
society delegates were unable to attend as the 
UN security office only issued 130 passes – some 
participants waited in line early on Monday morning 
for several hours, but were turned away. These 
access issues only worsened as the UNGASS opened 
the following day: the event seemed plagued with 
challenges ranging from disorganisation around 
entrance passes, to censorship of civil society 
t-shirts, to disrespectful treatment by UN personnel. 
The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UN-DESA) was coordinating the civil society 
accreditation, but sent out a mass confirmation 
email only to follow it with a mass retraction. 
Numerous NGO representatives, many of whom 
were traveling from all over the world to attend the 
UNGASS, were not informed until the last minute 
(and only after several inquiries) whether they were 
accredited to attend at all. Some NGOs had been 
advised in writing that they would not need special 
events passes, only to be turned away when they 
appeared at the opening session. Problems with civil 
society passes continued throughout the meeting, 
with some delegates even being denied access into 
side events that they helped to coordinate or were 
speaking in (see Box 4). The official reason for the 
arcane pass system was security, with various heads 
of state present in the building for the UNGASS and 
other meetings. Yet it should be noted that these 
special event passes were just anonymous pieces of 
coloured card issued at street corners around the 
UN building at 7:00 am (see image) – hardly the 
most secure system available to the United Nations, 
which routinely organises much larger meetings 
than this one. 
Civil society also faced restrictions and censorship 
when it came to literature and reports, with 
advanced requests for somewhere to disseminate 
documents being denied or ignored. Some 
organisations’ literature was arbitrarily confiscated 
at the entrance and some delegates were even 
turned away because of the reform-minded 
messages on their t-shirts (such as ‘Marijuana is 
Safer than Alcohol’, or indeed anything with a 
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cannabis leaf on), seemingly dependent on the 
mood of the security guards. Attempts by IDPC and 
the Civil Society Task Force to address these issues 
during the UNGASS with multiple UN departments 
were fruitless: UN-DESA, UN Security, the Office 
of the President of the General Assembly, and the 
CND secretariat all consistently refused to take 
responsibility and placed the blame on one another 
– even after interventions and support from a 
number of member states. All of these issues left 
a bitter taste in the mouth, and ran counter to the 
supportive rhetoric about civil society engagement 
from the President of the General Assembly.
Yet despite the barriers, the voice of civil society 
– including affected populations such as people 
who use drugs – was strongly heard at the UN-
GASS, both in the preparations and the meet-
ing itself. Nearly 60 civil society organisations or 
networks submitted contributions to the debate 
through the official UNGASS website – including 
IDPC and a number of IDPC members.49 Although 
these submissions may have had a limited impact 
on the final Outcome Document, we hope that 
this website will be maintained as a legacy of the 
UNGASS to reflect the breadth and scope of civil 
society’s expertise and contribution to the debate 
more broadly. At the meeting itself, the govern-
ment delegations of Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, 
Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Thailand, among others, includ-
ed civil society representatives, and hundreds of 
civil society participants were registered to attend. 
Many more also attended a series of public-facing 
events and activities around the UN building – in-
cluding a Cannabis Science and Policy Summit on 
17th and 18th April,50 a public rally for drug policy 
reform on 18th April followed by an event for af-
fected families, and a full programme of engaging 
activities at the Museum of Drug Policy, a pop-up 
cultural hub in New York for art, presentations and 
other live events.51 This strong and impactful mo-
bilisation owed a great deal to the ongoing sup-
port and engagement of the Open Society Foun-
dations, who also operated the Stop The Harm 
campaign to help coordinate and strengthen UN-
GASS engagement.52
Inside the UNGASS, each of the five roundtable 
debates included pre-selected civil society 
panellists and also allowed civil society participants 
to intervene from the floor, and in many cases these 
were the highlights of the sessions as described 
above. At the Plenary itself, the sixth and final 
session allowed time for a series of impactful and 
moving interventions from pre-selected civil society 
participants (albeit late in the afternoon): the Kenya 
Hospices and Palliative Care Association, FORUT (a 
Norwegian drug prevention organisation), FAZZA, 
the Pro Coalition Association. 
Tuari Potiki from the New Zealand Drugs Founda-
tions also made a strong statement in the Plenary, 
questioning the mere rationale of prohibitionist 
policies. ‘Sometimes, when we are threatened, we 
go to war, and we go to war against the wrong 
Tuari Potiki, New Zealand Drugs Foundation, at the final Plenary session of the UNGASS
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people. If we decided to wage a war against can-
cer, would we do that by bombing people who 
have cancer? Many nations have joined up to 
wage a war against drugs and have ended up at-
tacking and harming who really are in need of our 
help and our support... You are here to discuss the 
world drug problem, but many of you directly con-
tributed to their problems by denying yourselves 
access to vital support such as harm reduction; the 
support that saved my life. You are actively block-
ing progress towards providing help to those who 
most need it. If you are not part of the solution, 
then you are part of the problem… If there is a war 
to be fought, and I believe that there is, it should 
be a war on poverty, on disparity and on the mul-
titude of political and historical factors that have 
left and continue to leave so many people vulner-
able and in jeopardy’.
Charan Sharma from the India HIV/AIDS Alliance 
also spoke in support of harm reduction and against 
forced treatment, criminalisation, the death penalty 
and the notion of a drug-free world. He called on 
member states to ‘Ensure that policy is informed by 
evidence of what works: accessible, holistic, peo-
ple-centred services, tailored to the needs of peo-
ple who use drugs. I appeal to you to stop arresting 
and incarcerating people for consumption and pos-
session of drugs for personal use. The death penalty 
for drug related offences must be abolished. I ap-
peal to you to support drug users and organisations 
working with us, to participate meaningfully in de-
sign and delivery of Harm Reduction services’.53 
Throughout all of the Plenary sessions, civil society 
participants were confined to the third floor balcony 
but were regularly heard.
Museum of drug policy (coordinated by OSF)Families speak out against the war on drugs (demonstration 
coordinated by Transform)
Charan Sharma, India HIV/AIDS Alliance, at the final Plenary session of the UNGASS
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Conclusions: Diplomacy or 
denialism?
The UNGASS on the world drug problem was a big 
moment for the drug policy reform movement. 
But it was also a big moment for the international 
drug control system more broadly, which contin-
ues to face a period of unrest and transition. In the 
end, the facade of the ‘Vienna Consensus’ between 
member states resulted in an Outcome Document 
that fell far short of the expectations of an open 
and honest assessment of what is, and what is not, 
working. Yet both sides of the debate seemed to 
come away from the negotiations with mixed feel-
ings and a sense of frustration which demonstrates 
that both had to concede ground, and the result is 
a document that undoubtedly takes a step forward 
from previous commitments – not least in terms of 
access to medicines, human rights,54 overdose pre-
vention and proportionate sentencing.55 The sense 
of frustration also lends itself to the increasing com-
plexity and fierceness of these UN debates,56 as well 
as to the stifling tactics employed by the UNGASS 
Board to supress any challenges to the status quo.
Despite the areas of progress in the Outcome 
Document, it is important that this is not 
remembered as the only outcome of the UNGASS – 
the five roundtable summaries, the UN submissions 
and engagement, the civil society presence (in 
the face of adversity), and the country statements 
in the Plenary are also important outcomes 
from this meeting that all lay the foundation 
for ongoing advocacy and policy change. The 
country statements in particular demonstrate that 
the ‘Vienna Consensus’ has become irreversibly 
shattered – with the divergent stances of member 
states impossible to ignore on key issues such as 
the death penalty, decriminalisation, regulated 
markets and development.57
The UNGASS was more evolutionary than 
revolutionary – setting the stage for future debates, 
rather than being the main act itself. Although those 
who built expectations of 2016 as the end of the 
‘war on drugs’ may have come away disappointed, 
the meeting and debates do represent tangible 
progress and an important milestone on the road 
to the next UN review in 2019 or 2020. Work has 
to begin now to counter the Pavlovian response 
of the UN drugs architecture and ensure that this 
next meeting is not simply a repeat of what has 
gone before58 – including through the creation of 
an expert advisory group to address some of the 
existing tensions and to think through different 
scenarios for the future.59
In his closing remarks, the President of the General 
Assembly thanked participants for a ‘truly historic 
process’ and stated that ‘With your experience 
and expertise, you have brought home to us the 
immense human cost of this problem and indeed, 
at times, of the approaches we take to address it’. He 
also acknowledged that affected populations ‘need 
interventions that have proven to work and perhaps 
as importantly: they need honesty about those that 
have failed’. The challenge now for the drug policy 
reform sector is to maintain the momentum and 
attention which the UNGASS managed to achieve – 
within the UN, the media and broader civil society. 
This requires a concerted effort to keep the fire 
burning, rather than leaving it to burn out and to 
build on the steps forward and lessons learned to 
ensure further significant shifts in 2019 or 2020.
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